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The COVID-19 Macroeconomic Policy Response in Africa (CoMPRA) project was 
developed following a call for rapid response policy research into the COVID-19 
pandemic by the IDRC. The project’s overall goal is to inform macroeconomic 
policy development in response to the COVID-19 pandemic by low and middle-
income countries (LMICs) and development partners that results in more 
inclusive, climate-resilient, effective and gender-responsive measures through 
evidence-based research. This will help to mitigate COVID-19’s social and 
economic impact, promote recovery from the pandemic in the short term 
and position LMICs in the longer term for a more climate-resilient, sustainable 
and stable future. The CoMPRA project will focus broadly on African countries 
and specifically on six countries (Benin, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria 
and South Africa). SAIIA and CSEA, as the lead implementing partners for this 
project, also work with think tank partners in these countries. 
Executive summary  
The COVID-19 pandemic has had severe impacts on Nigeria’s macroeconomy and the livelihoods 
of households. The economy suffered from a recession in the third quarter of 2020, however, key 
sectors including telecommunications and information services (15.9%), financial institutions 
(13.34%), and quarrying and other minerals (21.16%) continued to experience significant 
growth, which led to a recovery. The Nigerian government has responded notably to address the 
pandemic’s impact on the economy. So far, $ 1.4 billion in additional spending has been executed, 
which is estimated at 0.3% of GDP. This paper examines the macroeconomic landscape and 
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policy interventions in Nigeria with the objective of developing lessons not only for Nigeria but for 
other developing economies.  
Introduction 
The COVID-19 pandemic has had severe impacts on the macroeconomy and the livelihoods 
of households globally. The restrictions to movement alongside the associated uncertainty 
stimulated a sudden decline in the demand for commodities and disrupted production, leading 
to the underutilisation of capital and labour. More specifically, as governments sought to curb 
the spread of the virus by implementing workplace and school closures, and encouraging social-
distancing practices, these policies led to a significant impact on all economies. A recent study 
on the impact of COVID-19 on gross domestic product (GDP) and trade finds that the pandemic 
caused a 2% decline in global GDP, a 2.5% decline in the GDP for developing countries, and a 
1.8% for industrialised countries.1  
For Nigeria, which saw its first case in February 2020, the economic contraction was severe and 
sustained leading to a recession in the third quarter of 2020. The economic contraction is the 
result of the adoption of lockdown measures – which had an impact on nearly all sectors of the 
economy – along with the pandemic’s impact on partner economies engaged in international 
trade and those providing foreign investment. Meanwhile, the income of the majority of citizens 
has been affected, because a large share of informal workers has no recourse to unemployment 
insurance or paid leave of absence.  
Consequently, the Nigerian government has increased its spending plans – delivering an 
additional $ 1.4 billion, estimated to be 0.3% of GDP, through cash transfers, tax rebates, loans 
and loan guarantees, among other mediums – to counteract the effect of the pandemic on 
domestic and business income and spending. Furthermore, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
has adopted a more accommodating monetary policy stance and injected liquidity into the 
banking system to increase available credit to the private sector. 
A fiscal year has elapsed since the pandemic started and the policies were put in place, and 
macroeconomic policy responses have begun to gain traction. This research and policy insight 
examines the macroeconomic landscape and policy interventions in Nigeria in order to develop 
lessons to guide economic policymakers in developing countries to create sustained economic 
recovery.  
1 Maryla Maliszewska, Aaditya Mattoo and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, “The Potential Impact of COVID-19 on GDP and Trade: A Preliminary 
Assessment”, World Bank, East Asia and the Pacific Region Policy Research Working Paper 9211, April 2020, http://documents1.worldbank.org/
curated/en/295991586526445673/pdf/The-Potential-Impact-of-COVID-19-on-GDP-and-Trade-A-Preliminary-Assessment.pdf. 
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Section 2 of the policy insight provides an overview of Nigeria’s macroeconomic landscape and 
policy interventions, while section 3 details the impact of the pandemic on key development 
indicators and assesses the efficacy of government support. Section 4 discusses lessons for 
Nigeria as well as low-income and lower-middle-income countries, and section 5 provides 
concluding remarks. 
Overview of the macroeconomic landscape 
and policy interventions 
This section provides an overview of Nigeria’s macroeconomic conditions since the pandemic 
began. It examines resilient sectors and growth challenges, volatility in the foreign exchange 
market and trends in inflation. Furthermore, policy interventions, including fiscal and monetary 
responses, are discussed. 
How has the pandemic impacted Nigeria’s macroeconomy? 
Nigeria’s economy has been weakened as a result of domestic and global developments since 
the emergence of the pandemic. The detection of the first case in the country February 2020 
necessitated stringent lockdown measures from the end of 30 March 2020. However, authorities 
mandated a gradual reduction in restrictions beginning in early May (phase 1), early June 
(phase 2) and early September 2020 (phase 3).2 These restrictions – as well as the impact of the 
pandemic on Nigeria’s major trading partners, including China and Europe – have led to a severe 
economic contraction through a decline in demand, disruptions to production and increased 
uncertainty.  
Figure 1 shows the steep decline in growth rates from the second quarter of 2020 when the 
economy contracted to -6.1%. The contraction continued in the third quarter (-3.6%) with the 
economy falling into a recession and exiting the recession in the fourth quarter (0.11%). While 
the pandemic has had an impact on both the oil and non-oil sectors, the latter has driven the 
recovery. This is associated with the relatively low contribution (only 10% in 2019) of the oil sector 
to GDP.3 Consequently, the agriculture and services sectors have been the major growth drivers 
(see Figure 2). Data from the National Bureau of Statistics shows the key sectors that recorded 
growth during 2020 included telecommunications and information services (15.9%), financial 
2 International Monetary Fund, “Policy Responses to COVID-19, May 7, 2021, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-
COVID-19#N. 
3 World Bank, “Macro Poverty Outlook for Nigeria”, MPO 269, April 2021, https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/848651492188167743/mpo-nga.pdf. 
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institutions (13.34%) and quarrying and other minerals (21.16%).4 The persistent growth in these 
sectors is underpinned by the consistent demand for agriculture commodities, as well as mobile, 
internet and financial services, even during lockdown. Moreover, these sectors have weak links to 
global supply chains and, as such, were relatively unaffected by production disruptions.  
4 Others include cement (3.88%), water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation (3.81%), chemical and pharmaceutical products 
(2.54%), human health and social services (2.23%), crop production (2.24%), livestock (1.91%), food, beverage and tobacco (1.5%) (see National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2020, Nigerian Gross Domestic Product Report. Q4 and Full Year 2020).
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2021. Nigerian Gross Domestic Product Report (Q4 and Full Year 2020)
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Furthermore, the pandemic’s impact on the oil price led to volatilities in the foreign exchange 
market and reductions in the fiscal space. Presently, the oil sector accounts for 80% of export 
earnings and 50% of consolidated government revenue.5 The decline in oil revenue also occurred 
alongside reductions in tax revenue – owing to the economic contraction – which has led to an 
estimated $ 10 billion decline in consolidated government revenue in 2020.6 Furthermore, the 
most recent estimates show that government revenue declined from 8% to 5% of GDP between 
2019 and 2020.7 Meanwhile, reduced contributions from oil in export earnings necessitated 
the CBN’s devaluation of the local currency (naira/NAN) on two occasions when the official 
exchange rate was adjusted from NAN 307/$ 1 to NAN 361/$ 1 in March 2020 and subsequently 
to NAN 379/$ 1 in June 2020.8 Similarly, the naira depreciated from NAN 360/$ 1 to NAN 387/$ 1 
at the investors’ and exporters’ window, which offers a more market-determined rate compared 
to the official window, which the CBN manages mainly by drawing on foreign reserves. The 
aim of the investors’ and exporters’ window is to offer a competitive rate closely aligned with 
the market rate. As a result, reserves have declined by 10% since the pandemic began – from 
$ 38.5 billion in January 2020 to $ 34.7 billion in May 2021.9 Historically, the naira has alternated 
between a fixed and floating exchange rate regime, with the CBN typically floating the exchange 
rate, while the parallel market premium widens. As such, the devaluation occurred despite the 
CBN’s intervention in the foreign exchange market and the sale of foreign exchange to currency 
exchange platforms.  
As Nigeria is an import-dependent economy – importing about $ 100 billion worth of goods and 
services in 2019 10 – the devaluation of the naira has contributed to a persistent rise in commodity 
prices. In a single year, between February 2020 and 2021, inflation increased from 11.5% to 14% 
(see Figure 4). The major driver of inflation is the rise in food prices, from 13.98% to 17.25% during 
the same period. The rise in food prices is linked to the insecurity in food-producing areas and 
the partial closure of Nigeria’s land borders with countries contributing towards its food supply: 
Benin, Togo, Niger, Cameroon and Chad.11 Furthermore, in order to conserve foreign exchange 
and increase local production, the CBN recommended banning imports of key agricultural 
commodities including maize (in September 2020), and sugar and wheat (in April 2021), 
5 World Bank, “Rising to the Challenge: Nigeria’s COVID Response”, Nigeria Development Update, December 2020, https://openknowledge.worldbank 
.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34921/Rising-to-the-Challenge-Nigerias-COVID-Response.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
6 World Bank, “Rising to the Challenge”.
7 World Bank, “Nigeria in Times of COVID-19: Laying Foundations for a Strong Recovery”, Nigeria Development Update, June 2020, http://documents 
1.worldbank.org/curated/en/695491593024516552/pdf/Nigeria-in-Times-of-COVID-19-Laying-Foundations-for-a-Strong-Recovery.pdf. 
8 Central Bank of Nigeria, “CBN Exchange Rates”, 2021, https://www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/ExchRateByCurrency.asp. NAN is the currency code for 
Nigerian naira.
9 Central Bank of Nigeria, “Export Reserves”, 2021, https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Functions/export.asp?tablename=reserve. 
10 World Bank, “Imports of goods and services (BoP, current US$) – Nigeria”, International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and 
Data Files, 2021, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BM.GSR.GNFS.CD?locations=NG. 
11 Matthieu Millecamps, “The Benin-Nigeria Border is Officially Open Again, but Smuggling is on the Rise”, The Africa Report, January 18, 2021,  
https://www.theafricareport.com/59504/the-benin-nigeria-border-is-officially-open-again-but-smuggling-is-on-the-rise/.
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which reduced the competition on the local markets with 
implications for food prices.12 Other factors that have led to 
the continuous rise in prices include an increase in fuel and 
electricity charges due to subsidies being removed for both, 
and a rise in the VAT rate from 5% to 7.5% in February 2021.  
However, the economic recovery is largely underpinned by the 
continuation of the CBN’s development finance interventions 
in the real sector, and government’s monetary financing to 
meet budget shortfalls. The agriculture, manufacturing and 
services sectors continue to benefit from similar levels of 
government support in the form of loans and loan guarantees 
as before the pandemic.13 The CBN’s credit to the private 
sector remains high at NAN 2.220 trillion in 2020, relative 
to NAN 2.224 trillion in 2019, pointing to the continuation 
of existing development finance interventions (Figure 3). 
Generally, these development finance interventions are in 
the form of the CBN providing two-step loans to commercial 
banks for onward lending to the private sector. In addition, 
the implementation of a fiscal stimulus in the wake of the 
pandemic amid declining government revenue has increased 
the CBN’s monetary financing. As shown in Figure 3, there 
was a 21% increase in the credit to the government from  
NAN 8.3 trillion to NAN 10.05 trillion between 2019 and 
2020, which is attributed to the CBN’s financing of the 
government’s budget deficits. The fiscal stimulus package 
as well as government’s intervention in the foreign exchange 
market have further aided economic recovery.  
Digitisation is a key structural issue that hinders the country 
from reaching its economic goals – noting that individuals 
with access to internet as a share of the population was 
12 Tope Alake, ‘“Dollar Ban for Wheat may add to Nigeria Food ’Scarcity”, Bloomberg, April 
21, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-21/nigeria-dollar-ban-for-
wheat-and-sugar-may-add-to-food-scarcity. 
13 The agriculture sector benefits from up to 11 initiatives including Agricultural Credit 
Guarantee Scheme, Commercial Agricultural Credit Scheme and Anchor Borrowers 
Programme, while the manufacturing sector benefits from up to nine initiatives including 
Power and Airline Intervention Fund, Textile Sector Intervention Facility and Real Sector 
Support Fund (see Central Bank of Nigeria, “Monetary Policy Review”, February 2020, 
https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2020/CCD/MPR%20Feb%202020%20(Repaired).pdf.
“The rise in food prices 
is linked to the insecurity 
in food-producing areas 
and the partial closure 
of Nigeria’s land borders 
with countries contributing 
towards its food supply 
Benin, Togo, Niger, 
Cameroon and Chad”
“However, the economic 
recovery is largely 
underpinned by the 
continuation of the CBN’s 
development finance 
interventions in the real 
sector, and government’s 
monetary financing to  
meet budget shortfalls”
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only 7% in 2017.14 The low level of internet penetration has negatively impacted several sectors, 
including industry and trade, as well as financial, education and health service delivery. For 
instance, trading across borders and gaining access to online markets is severely limited without 
internet access. Furthermore, the need for face-to-face interaction to deliver financial, education 
and health services reduces efficiency and reach of services. 
14 World Bank, “Individuals Using the Internet (% of Population) - Nigeria”, International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication 
Indicators Database, 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=NG. 
Figure 3 CBN’s credit to the government and the private sector (N); 
2019 and 2020
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Figure 4 Inflation (%); October 2019 to February 2021
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What were the key macroeconomic policy interventions? 
The weakening macroeconomic fundamentals fostered the government’s response in the wake 
of the pandemic – this included the additional spending of $ 1.4 billion mentioned previously.15 
The majority of the fiscal stimulus – $ 1.1 billion – is targeted at non-health sectors that have 
been affected by the pandemic, such as the hospitality and manufacturing sectors, as well the 
pharmaceutical industry and social protection programmes needed to mitigate the pandemic’s 
effect. Furthermore, tax refunds were offered to businesses that did not lay off workers during 
2020. Meanwhile, the health sector benefitted from $ 0.3 billion. (See Table 1 for detailed 
government interventions.) The large spending plans amid the constrained fiscal space has 
implications on government indebtedness – the government debt-to-GDP ratio reached 35.1% in 
2020 from 29.2% in 2019.16 Similarly, the share of non-performing loans to outstanding loans stood 
at 6.1% in January 2021, which is above the 5% prudential requirement stipulated by the CBN.17 
While the current debt-to-GDP ratio remains below the 60% benchmark specified by the African 
Monetary Cooperation Programme, the share of revenue deployed towards debt servicing shows a 
more accurate picture of the fiscal and debt situation. Specifically, the shortage of finance led to 
the government spending up to 96% of revenue generated on interest payments in 2020.18  
Despite the upward pressure on the exchange rate and inflation, the CBN adopted an 
accommodating policy regime to increase available credit to the private sector through 
commercial banks. Consequently, the CBN cut the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) from 13.5% to 
12.5% in May 2020, and subsequently to 11.5% in September 2020.19 In addition to reductions in 
the MPR, the CBN deployed other policy interventions. The interest rate to the aforementioned 
CBN development finance interventions targeted at the agriculture and manufacturing sectors 
was reduced from 9% to 5%, and a one-year moratorium was introduced on the interventions.20 
However, the ability of commercial banks to extend loans has been largely undermined by the 
limited availability of credit data on individuals for making lending decisions. In addition, the cash 
reserve ratio – the share of commercial banks’ liquidity reserved with the CBN – was increased from 
22.5% to 27.5% in January 2020 with the aim of improving the resilience of the financial system 
15 International Monetary Fund, “Summary of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic since January 2020”, April 2021,  
https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/~/media/Files/Topics/COVID/FM-Database/april-2021-fiscal-measures-response-database-
publication-mar30.ashx. 
16 International Monetary Fund, “Regional Economic Outlook Sub-Saharan Africa: Navigating a Long Pandemic”, April 2021, https://www.imf.org/en/
Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2021/04/15/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-april-2021. 
17 Central Bank of Nigeria, “Economic Report January 2021”, January 2021, https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2021/RSD/January%202021%20Economic% 
20Report.pdf. 
18 International Monetary Fund, ‘“Nigeria: Request for Purchase Under the Rapid Financing Instrument”, Country Report’ no. 20/142, April 2020, 
https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2020/English/1NGAEA2020001.ashx. 
19 Central Bank of Nigeria, “Monetary Policy Decisions”, January 2021, https://www.cbn.gov.ng/MonetaryPolicy/decisions.asp. 
20 Central Bank of Nigeria, “CBN Policy Measures in Response to COVID-19 Outbreak and Spillovers”, March 16, 2020, https://www.cbn.gov.ng/
Out/2020/FPRD/CBN%20POLICY%20MEASURES%20IN%20RESPONSE%20TO%20COVID-19%20OUTBREAK%20AND%20SPILLOVERS.pdf. 
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largely due to the rise in inflation.21 Since the pandemic, the cash reserve ratio has not been revised 
downwards, which has had an unintended consequence of limiting banks’ credit creation capacity. 
21 Central Bank of Nigeria, “Monetary Policy Decisions”, 2020, https://www.cbn.gov.ng/MonetaryPolicy/decisions.asp. 
Table 1 Nigeria’s macroeconomic policy responses 
Type Policy response
Fiscal policies Conditional cash transfer programme to 3.7 million people and an increase of the social 
register by 1 million households. The selection process follows a funnel approach where the 
poorest households in the poorest local government areas within the poorest states are 
prioritised. However, according to the 2019 Nigerian Living Standards Survey, 83 million 
Nigerians live in poverty implying that 78.3 million Nigerians are excluded from  
the programme.
Creating a NAN 50 billion ($ 139 million) targeted credit facility to the private sector
NAN 2 trillion ($ 5.3 billion) loan to the manufacturing sector
NAN 1.5 trillion ($ 3.9 billion) loan to the real sector
NAN 100 billion ($ 263 million) intervention to the health sector
NAN 3.6 trillion ($ 9.5 billion) injection to the banking system for loan creation
NAN 300 billion ($ 789.5 million) MSME Development Fund targeted at micro, small, and 
medium-sized businesses
NAN 75 billion ($ 197.4 million) Nigerian Youth Investment Fund targeted at young 
entrepreneurs
Increase in VAT from 5% to 7.5%
Removal of fossil fuel subsidies, which was estimated at $ 2.7 billion in 2018a 
Removal of subsidies to the electricity sector, which was estimated at $ 377 million in 2018b 
Tax rebate to companies that did not retrench staff in 2020
Special Public Works Programme for the vulnerable particularly those with low skills and 
without employment
Monetary policies Reduction of the MPR from 13.5% to 11.5%
Reduction of the interest rate on CBN interventions from 9% to 5%
Provision of an additional one-year moratorium on all CBN interventions cutting across 
the agriculture, manufacturing and services sectors
Exchange rate and 
balance of payment
Official devaluation of the naira from NAN 307/$ 1 to NAN 379/$ 1
a International Energy Agency, “IEA Fossil Fuel Subsidies Database”, 2020, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/6ad1127d-821a-4c98-b58d-
d53108fe70c8/IEA-Fossil-Fuel-Subsidies-2010-2019.xlsx. 
b International Energy Agency, “IEA Fossil Fuel Subsidies Database”. 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on International Monetary Fund 2021 policy responses to COVID-19. Retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/
imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#N.
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The CBN’s interventions in the real sector have constrained expansion efforts in money 
market operations. In the first half of 2020, sales of the CBN bills offered at the open market 
operations auctions were valued at NAN 6.45 trillion, which is nearly half of the sales recorded 
in 2019 (estimated at NAN 1.83 trillion).22 The decline in open market operations resulted in the 
tightening of liquidity conditions. 
There was also private sector support to complement the broad fiscal and monetary policies 
interventions. The Coalition Against COVID-19, working with the government, the Nigeria Centre 
for Disease Control and the World Health Organization, is the major private sector task force 
dedicated to combating COVID-19 in Nigeria. Their interventions are anchored around the health 
sector, food relief programmes and awareness campaigns. For instance, the Coalition equipped 
medical facilities across the country’s six geopolitical zones, enhanced capacity for testing and 
treatment, and built test laboratories, and isolation and treatment centres. As of November 
2020, its total expenditure amounted to NAN 43.27 billion ($ 113.88 million).23  
Development impact of COVID-19 and  
the efficacy of government support 
One of the major transmission channels of the pandemic’s effect on the economy is the 
labour market given that the health burden (morbidity and death) on the affected population 
represents a productivity loss in the economy. Similarly, the containment and mitigation 
strategies initially implemented severely constrained trade and production activities. These 
have had immediate economic effects in terms of job losses, lower revenue for businesses and 
increased poverty for households. Based on the current labour market trends, the World Bank 
estimated that,24 without a holistic policy response, an additional 10 million Nigerians could fall 
into extreme poverty by 2022.25 This will significantly worsen the poverty situation considering 
that 83 million Nigerians were estimated to already be living below the poverty line in 2019.26  
22 Central Bank of Nigeria, “Financial Markets Department. Half-Year Activity Report”, 2020, https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2021/FMD/2020%20
FMD%20Half%20Year%20Activity%20Report.pdf. 
23 Central Bank of Nigeria, “Press Conference on Activities by CACOVID”, 2020, https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2020/CCD/CACOVID%20press%20
conference%20FINAL.pdf.
24 Alexander Irwin, Jonathan Lain and Tara Vishwanath, “Using Data to Combat the Ongoing Crisis, and the Next, in Nigeria”, World Bank Blog, 
January 28, 2021, https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/using-data-combat-ongoing-crisis-and-next-nigeria. 
25 World Bank Poverty Team, “COVID-19 and Welfare in Nigeria: New Evidence for Policy”, October 2020, https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/9617916 
11161231868/pdf/COVID-19-and-Welfare-in-Nigeria-New-Evidence-for-Policy-October-2020.pdf. 
26 National Bureau of Statistics, “2019 Poverty and Inequality Nigeria”, May 2020, https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/download/1092. 
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Evidence from the COVID-19 phone survey in Nigeria by the 
National Bureau of Statistics 27 points to a significant loss of 
livelihood at both the peak of economic restrictions and as 
the economy reopened. The rapid phone survey and polls have 
elicited responses on a number of important issues including 
employment, business performance and food security. These 
are key to assessing macroeconomic performance and 
dealing with the pandemic. In April 2020, during the first 
phase of restrictions to movement (including inter-state 
travelling and shutdown of economic activities in commercial 
cities), about 57.4% of the adult population reported being 
out of work and 81% of businesses reported lower or zero 
revenue month-on-month (see Table 2). The unemployment 
rate of 57.4% is significantly higher than the pre-pandemic 
unemployment rate, which was 23% in the third quarter 
of 2018.28 By the third phase, specifically in the third and 
fourth quarters of 2020, most of the economic indicators 
had improved but none had reached the pre-crisis level. By 
December 2020, only 29.8% of the adult population reported 
being out of work in both the formal and informal sectors, 
and 37% of businesses reported lower or zero revenue. 
Food insecurity worsened significantly due to inflation and 
labour market shocks, and this affected household income 
and consumption patterns. Table 2 shows that more than 
half of the respondents were unable to purchase two key 
staple foods (rice and cassava) in April 2020. However, the 
share of those unable to purchase food supplies had fallen 
to 20.3% for rice and 12.82% for cassava in December 2020, 
pointing to a gradual recovery. This has implications for the 
achievement of Agenda 2030 goals in Nigeria with respect to 
poverty alleviation (SDG 1) and ending hunger and achieving 
food security (SDG 2). Nevertheless, the future trends in 
employment, business profitability and food security depend 
on the size and effectiveness of policy responses.  
27 The survey covers between 1 000 and 1 500 household monthly. https://microdata.world 
bank.org/index.php/catalog/3712.
28 National Bureau of Statistics, “Labor Force Statistics – Volume 2: Unemployment and 
Underemployment by State”, 2018, https://ndlink.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Q3_ 
2018_unemployment_by_State-1.pdf.
“Based on the current 
labour market trends, the 
World Bank estimated that,  
without a holistic policy 
response, an additional 10 
million Nigerians could fall 
into extreme poverty by 
2022. This will significantly 
worsen the poverty situation 
considering that 83 million 
Nigerians were estimated to 
already be living below the 
poverty line in 2019”
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Insights from the survey show that access and coverage of 
government support is minimal. The share of respondents 
receiving assistance from the government stood at 0.77% 
of the population in April 2020 and rose to 2.17% in May but 
declined consistently afterwards (Figure 5). Although the 
majority of the population did not benefit from government’s 
targeted social transfers, there is a gradual withdrawal of 
this support, indicating a shift in priorities. The rebound in 
employment, business revenue and food security reflect 
the pro-growth policy measures that have had an impact 
on both households and businesses. This signals that 
stronger recovery efforts should be anchored on increasing 
government assistance towards sectors that drive growth 
and employment. However, social protection programmes 
still have a role to play particularly in providing food security.  
Table 2 Impact of COVID-19 on key development indicators in Nigeria (%) 
April to December 2020
Dimension of impact April August December
Employment
     % of adult population not working 57.44 30.55 29.86
Revenue losses: Change in business revenue
     Lower/no revenue 81.2 46.02 37.37
     No change in revenue 8.25 17.13 17.9
     Higher revenue 10.54 36.85 44.74
Food security: % of respondents who are unable to buy Nigerian staple food
     Rice 59.14 36.56 20.33
     Cassava 51.79 17.56 12.82
Source: Authors’ analysis based on World Bank and National Bureau of Statistics, 2021. COVID-19 National Longitudinal Phone Survey 2020
“The rebound in 
employment, business 
revenue and food security 
reflect the pro-growth policy 
measures that have had an 
impact on both households 
and businesses. This signals 
that stronger recovery 
efforts should be anchored 
on increasing government 
assistance towards sectors 
that drive growth and 
employment”
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Lessons for Nigeria and 
other low-income and lower-
middle-income countries 
The swiftness and scope of the CBN’s response since the 
onset of the pandemic is notable. The availability of credit 
to the real economy since March 2020 has targeted sectors 
of importance to the economic recovery agenda including 
manufacturing and services. Moreover, the CBN’s response 
occurred in the context of several ongoing development 
finance interventions to the real sector. Furthermore, the 
national data collection agency, specifically the National 
Bureau of Statistics, has been proactive in collecting timely 
and frequent data. This has informed analysis and been used 
to develop insights on how the pandemic has affected both 
households and businesses. In many African countries where 
conducting regular surveys is uncommon, Nigeria serves as a 
leading example. 
“The availability of credit 
to the real economy since 
March 2020 has targeted 
sectors of importance to the 
economic recovery agenda 
including manufacturing 
and services”
Figure 5 Beneficiaries of the government support programme as 
a share of the population, and the value of government 
support, April to November 2020
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Nevertheless, the role the CBN has taken with regards to 
credit support points to several gaps in the policy response. 
First, the support to businesses largely involves loans without 
leveraging other interventions, such as tax cuts, moratoriums 
on debt repayment and wage subsidies. For businesses with 
access to loans – and worse for those without loans – these 
financial commitments (tax, debt, and wage payments) 
could outweigh the support from government and have 
implications on business profitability and solvency.  
Second, both federal and sub-national governments are 
fiscally handicapped because the country entered the 
crisis with a history of limited fiscal space. This limited 
government’s capacity to respond to the crisis and widened 
the CBN’s appetite for continued support to the private 
sector. This poses a concern regarding the risk exposure of the 
CBN in the case of an extensive private sector default, and 
debt monetisation. This is of concern given the large share of 
revenue deployed towards debt servicing and also considering 
that non-performing loans as a share of outstanding loans 
remains above the 5% benchmark stipulated by the CBN.  
The proclivity towards issuing new money in order to finance 
budget shortfalls has been associated with upward pressure 
on inflation.29 As a result of the negative effects of monetary 
financing, central banks in the European Union are explicitly 
mandated not to engage in direct monetary financing 
under the Maastricht Treaty (Article 130 of the treaty of the 
functioning of the European Union).30 However, there is an 
ongoing shift in central banking – termed quantitative easing – 
that supports the large-scale purchase of government bonds 
29 Jane Bogoev, Goran Petrevski and Bruno S. Sergi, “Investigating the Link Between Central 
Bank Independence and Inflation in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from Panel Data 
Models”, Eastern European Economics, 50 (4) (2012): 78–96, https://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/abs/10.2753/EEE0012-8775500405. 
30 Andrew Watt, “Quantitative Easing with Bite: A Proposal for Conditional Overt  
Monetary Financing of Public Investment”, IMK Working Paper, No. 148, March 2015,  
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/110391/1/82030462X.pdf. 
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to maintain low interest rates.31 Quantitative easing has also 
been adopted by countries facing deflation, as was the case 
in Japan from 2001 to 2006 when the Bank of Japan sought 
to bring an end to deflation.32  
In the case of Nigeria, the CBN is undertaking direct 
monetary financing in the form of printing money within the 
context of persistent inflation. As such, the independence 
of a central bank in low-income and lower-middle income 
countries with similar conditions to Nigeria is key to 
macroeconomic stability. Times of crisis are no excuse to flout 
the rules that govern macroeconomic stability. Achieving 
independence from the central bank is underpinned by a 
country’s ability to build fiscal buffers and maintain fiscal 
prudence.  
Accordingly, there is the need to build fiscal buffers to 
navigate future crisis. In Nigeria, as in several developing 
countries, this will involve expanding the tax base – not 
explicitly by increasing tax rates but by curbing tax evasion 
and avoidance. More so, given that a large share of revenue 
is generated from oil, transparent and efficient management 
of natural resource revenues, including establishing a natural 
resource fund, will address revenue leakages. On expenditure, 
streamlining governance structures for countries with a high 
cost of governance is a policy option towards building fiscal 
buffers. Nigeria, with one of the highest costs of governance 
globally, could lead in this regard.33  
31 Daniela Gabor, “Revolution Without Revolutionaries: Interrogating the Return of Monetary 
Financing”, Transformative Responses to the Crisis, March 2021: 3–31, http://tankona.free.fr/
gabor121.pdf. 
32 Miguel Angel Pesce, “Transmission Mechanisms for Monetary Policy in Emerging Market 





33 Emmanuel Mayah, Chiara Mariotti, Evelyn Mere and Celestine Okwudili Odo, “Inequality 
in Nigeria. Exploring the Drivers”, Oxfam International Policy Paper, May 16, 2017, https://
www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/cr-inequality-in-nigeria-170517-en.pdf. 
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Furthermore, commercial banks are largely unable to meet credit demands. On the demand 
side, asymmetric information in borrowing markets – owing to limited information on the credit 
worthiness of borrowers – has led to high interest rates on loans to cover risky borrowers. As such, 
the loans and loan guarantees offered within the purview of the CBN’s development finance 
interventions require collateral (in some cases). Moreover, the weak monetary policy transmission 
– common in developing countries owing to heavy central bank interventions in the foreign 
exchange market, low rates of interbank competition and a lack of market-determined interest 
rates34 – has made it such that reductions in the MPR do not reflect on the interest rates offered 
by commercial banks. On the supply side, banks in Nigeria are constrained, as the cash reserve 
ratio has not been reduced since the pandemic began. Moreover, the relatively high interest rates 
offered in treasury bills and government bond markets incentivises commercial banks to invest in 
government bonds (that are largely risk-free) rather than lend to the private sector. As a result of 
these shortcomings, direct lending by the central bank can be adopted to mitigate against some 
barriers particularly the high collateral and interest rate associated with borrowing. This has been 
done by the United States’ Federal Reserve in the wake of the pandemic.35  
Other gaps exist with regards to targeting and coverage of the government’s spending plans. 
First, the government’s limited spending plan, high level of informality and low financial 
inclusion has led to a large share of the population being left behind with regards to direct 
income support. As noted elsewhere in this policy insight, only 2.17% of the population surveyed 
benefitted from the government’s support in May 2020 with implications for vulnerability and 
poverty levels. Moreover, the lack of a gendered approach in the design and implementation 
of spending plans worsens the pandemic’s effect on women. For instance, failure to provide 
childcare subsidies (subsidising businesses and individuals for taking leave of absence for 
childcare purposes) is likely to affect the income and job security of women. South Korea 
stands out as a country with a gendered approach in its macroeconomic policy. It provided an 
emergency family care subsidy for workers taking a leave of absence for childcare during school 
closures.36  
Additionally, the reallocation of spending is not adequately targeted at achieving a green 
recovery, in particular, and sustainable development in general. While the government’s  
Economic Sustainability Plan (2020–2021) seeks to increase spending allocated to agriculture, 
renewable energy and infrastructure, the plan remains vague as to the mechanisms through 
which the investments will be made and focuses on unsatisfactory aspects of the sector. For 
34 Prachi Mishra, Peter Montiel and Antonio Spilimbergo, “Monetary Transmission in Low-Income Countries: Effectiveness and Policy Implications”, IMF 
Economic Review, 60 (2) (2012): 270–302, http://www.prachimishra.net/mms_ier_final_feb23.pdf. 
35 Board Of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Federal Reserve Board Announces it is Expanding the Scope and Eligibility for the Main Street 
Lending Program” April 30, 2020, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200430a.htm. 
36 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Policy Notes (Responding to COVID-19) Republic of Korea (2020)”, https://www.oecd.
org/education/Republic-of-Korea-responding-COVID-19-policy-notes.pdf. 
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instance, the focus on agriculture is to increase the farmland 
under cultivation rather than improve productivity and 
formalise the sector, which would increase the revenue 
generated from the sector. Other aspects such as education 
and health receive relatively less attention despite the fact 
that the pandemic has exposed structural weaknesses in 
these sectors.  
Lastly, the use of anti-trade restrictive policies should be 
reversed, such as closure of borders in the wake of the 
pandemic. Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Somalia closed 
their borders in March 2020, and Kenya in May 2020, mainly 
to contain the spread of the virus.37 Although Nigeria has 
reversed the closure of its borders, other countries are yet 
to reverse their border closure policies, which is inconsistent 
with the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement 
that advocates for free trade within the continent. One 
of the consequences of Nigeria’s border closure was a 
negative impact on border communities (in both Nigeria 
and neighbouring countries) that rely on informal trade as 
a source of livelihood.38 Similarly, the ban on the import of 
selected items in order to conserve foreign exchange earnings 
is not only anti-trade but could increase local food prices 
against the background of already rising food inflation. This 
has consequences for vulnerability and poverty. 
A key lesson across the policy responses is the need to 
strengthen the systems that underpin the delivery of the 
responses. An improved social protection system will be useful 
to reach the vulnerable and those in the informal sector, the 
same way that the creation of fiscal buffers will lead to more 
robust spending plans in times of crisis. Similarly, increased 
formalisation of the labour market will ensure that more 
37 Amnesty International, “East Africa: People Seeking Safety are Trapped at Borders Due to 
COVID-19 Measures”, June 22, 2020, https://www.amnes ty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/
east-africa-people-seeking-safety-are-trapped-at-borders-due-to-covid-19-measures/. 
38 Stephen Golub, Ahmadou Mbaye and Christina Golubski, “Africa in Focus: The Effects of 
Nigeria’s Closed Borders on Informal Trade with Benin”, Brookings, October 29, 2019,  
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/10/29/the-effects-of-nigerias-
closed-borders-on-informal-trade-with-benin/. 
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workers have recourse to necessary benefits including paid 
leave, unemployment insurance and health insurance – and a 
more developed health systems will increase preparedness in 
times of a health crisis. Adopting a long-term approach and 
building systems rather than once-off solutions is of crucial 
importance to shaping the economy. However, readjusting 
the spending plans to fit the present climate is important to 
ensure that the temporary fiscal stimulus does not become 
permanent, as this will have implications for sustainability.  
Conclusion 
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to unprecedented demand 
and supply shocks. However, governments have deployed 
macroeconomic policy responses targeted at providing 
relief for those affected. Nigeria has been severely affected 
by the economic shock with the economy falling into a 
recession in November of 2020, but exiting soon after. The 
economic recovery is largely as a result of the government’s 
interventions in the form of an increase in spending plans and 
interventions in the foreign exchange market – much of which 
has been led by the CBN through monetary financing to the 
government and the provision of development interventions 
to the private sector.  
Despite the proactive role of the government, several 
shortcomings have emerged with regards to Nigeria’s 
macroeconomic policies. The increase in the CBN’s appetite 
for continued support to the private sector poses concerns 
regarding the risk exposure to an extensive private sector 
default and debt monetisation. Furthermore, commercial 
banks are largely unable to meet credit demands due to an 
interplay of several factors including limited information on 
the credit worthiness of borrowers, weak monetary policy 
transmission and a high cash reserve ratio. Other gaps 
also exist, and a large share of the informal sector – the 
vulnerable population and women – are left behind in the 
government’s policy responses. Similarly, the narrow range of 
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interventions constricts businesses with outstanding financial 
commitments including tax, debt and wage payments.  
A key lesson for Nigeria and other developing countries 
includes ensuring the independence of the central bank 
even in the face of the crisis. Furthermore, a long-term 
approach should be adopted to strengthen the systems 
that underpin the delivery of the responses, including 
strengthening social protection and public health systems, 
formalising the labour market and creating fiscal buffers. The 
ICT sector, and others that can adapt to digital platforms, 
also showed more resilience and even growth during the 
pandemic, suggesting that anchoring recovery efforts and 
post-COVID economic structures in a digital economy could 
be beneficial. Furthermore, policy responses should align with 
broader development agreements including the Sustainable 
Development Goals, the Paris Climate Agreement and the 
African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement.  
“The ICT sector, and others 
that can adapt to digital 
platforms, also showed more 
resilience and even growth 
during the pandemic, 
suggesting that anchoring 
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in a digital economy could 
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Cover image: A man exchanges Nigeria’s currency, Naira, for US dollars in Lagos, Nigeria, on April 19, 2021. Nigeria’s 
economy was already struggling with a fall in the price of oil, Nigeria’s major export, and a weak local naira currency, 
before the global pandemic struck. Nigeria’s inflation soared to a four-year high of more than 18% in March 2021, with 
food prices up 22.9%, according to the National Bureau of Statistics  (Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images)
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